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The Fundamentals of Ethics
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Part 2, Chapters 13-16Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 2: “Normative Ethics: Doing the Right Thing”
Chapter 13 Summary and Analysis: “The Social Contract Tradition: The Theory and Its Attractions”
Chapter 13 turns to proceduralism, an ethical theory that begins its moral inquiry by assuming there is no right or wrong until proven otherwise. It posits that following the right procedure will always lead moral philosophers to the right conclusions. The golden rule, rule consequentialism, and Kant’s principle of universalizability are all examples of proceduralism. The most important and well-known proceduralist approach to ethics is the social contract theory, also called contractarianism.
Although it began as a political theory, contractarianism soon morphed into a moral theory. The political theory traces its origins to the ancient Greeks, but the modern version was formulated by English philosopher Tomas Hobbes (1588–1679). The moral theory stipulates that fair laws are ones that are accepted by free, equal, and rational people who have signed a social contract to live in cooperation with each other. In other words, actions are morally right if the above terms apply and everyone abides by them. Contractarianism assumes that humans are inherently selfish and wish to be greater than their peers. However, only few people make it to the top, so rather than competing fiercely, people enter into social contracts, curb their self-interests, and agree to cooperate to improve their general conditions. This is done on the condition that everyone abides by the rules of the social contract.
The prisoner’s dilemma explains why in some cases people are better off limiting their interests. It begins with a scenario in which two rational men (A and B) are sentenced to jail. Each is told separately that if he betrays his friend, he will be pardoned, while his friend will be sentenced to six years of prison. If each betrays the other, each will get a lighter sentence of four years. If both remain silent, they each get two years. There is only one optimal solution: for both to betray each other and get four years of prison each. This is because staying silent will never yield a good result if their individual goals are to minimize jail time (maximize their own well-being). In the first scenario, A confesses. B’s optimal choice is to confess as well for a total of four years in jail. If B remains silent, his friend will get away and he will remain jailed for six years, which is clearly not optimal. In the second scenario, A remains silent. B’s optimal choice is still to confess so he will be immediately pardoned. Thus, no matter what the other person chooses to do, the prisoner’s dilemma will always yield a single result that is not optimal for both parties.
Hobbes called these prisoner’s dilemmas the “state of nature.” This is a world in which there is no government or central authority to regulate people’s actions and everyone fends for their own self-interests. For everyone to be better off, there needs to be a set of rules that foster cooperation and discourage betrayal. Furthermore, there needs to be an enforcer for these rules to take effect. Contractarianism sees morality as a social phenomenon: Shafer-Landau agrees that ethics hardly matter if someone were stuck alone on a desert island. This capacity to trace the origins of morality is one of its advantages.
Contractarianist John Rawls (1921–2002) created the principle of the “veil of ignorance” to determine which rules would be ratified by social contractors. It imagines a veil that hides the personal features of social contractors, such as their sex, economic status, and ethnicity. Thus, contractarianism can logically explain why specific moral rules are widely accepted: They are ratified by rational, self-interested individuals free of prejudice against each other under the veil of ignorance. These individuals agree to obey the rules under the condition that others do, too. Thus, contractarianism is capable of logically explaining why certain rules are good for society while others are not.
The social contract theory views moral rules as objective. It is a secular theory since God is not involved in the creation of these rules. Rather, they have been agreed upon by all social contractors to the benefit of everyone. Although they are objective, moral rules under contractarianism are also capable of change: As long as social contractors amend their positions, all rules are malleable. Furthermore, these moral rules can be broken in exceptional circumstances (such as when held at gunpoint) or in situations where others have broken them as well. The latter situation might bring about a total collapse of trust, in which case the social contract breaks down and people are thrown back into the state of nature. Thus, contractarianism offers a reason for people to obey the law, a reason to punish those who do not follow the rules, and a justification for the state’s role as arbiter of criminal law. Finally, it allows for civil disobedience as a means to curb state power. When social contractors demand changes to legislation, they are automatically prone to breaking the clauses of the previous contract.
Chapter 14 Summary and Analysis: “The Social Contract Tradition: Problems and Prospects”
Shafer-Landau explores some problems with the social contract theory. The hardest point to defend for the contractarian is how to deal with those who are uninterested in abiding by the rules, such as amoralists (whom Hobbes terms “The Fool”) (208), or those who can cheat the system, such as free-riders. Hobbes defines rationality as knowing to maximize one’s self-interest. Since the social contract is meant to benefit everyone at the cost of some small sacrifice, it is difficult to account for the existence of people who act unjustly in a rational way. Although Hobbes cannot deny their existence, he can and does argue that people are more likely to be better off being just and abiding by the rules in the long run. This is not an infallible argument, and remaining virtuous in a society plagued with corruption is especially difficult to defend.
Another point of contention in contractarianism is the vague nature of the social contract itself. After all, nobody remembers signing such a contract. While it could be argued that abiding by the law is a form of tacit consent, there are situations in which silently obeying the rules may not equate consent. This is the case for people living under oppressive governments. The “Consent Argument” claims that only those who have consented to obey the law must abide by it. Since nobody seems to have signed the social contract, they are thus not required to abide by the law (214).
The consent argument is flawed because it states that disobeying rules is only immoral if one previously consented to respect them. The implication is that those who have not consented are morally correct to murder or pillage. Furthermore, even if the consent argument were true, it would not undermine contractarianism since the theory never claimed that everyone explicitly consented to follow the rules. Rather, it states that the rules are ones free and rational people would agree with for the sake of mutually beneficial cooperation. Contractarianism is first and foremost a guideline for evaluating social codes rather than a doctrine that preaches obeying the law.
Contractarianism falls apart if there arises a scenario in which social contractors disagree with each other about the terms of the contract. Rawls did not believe this was possible under the veil of ignorance. Nevertheless, if this scenario were truly to occur, the policy discussed would be considered morally neutral. Without a method of testing this, it is impossible to gauge how many moral rules would be agreed upon and how much disagreement would arise.
The social contract theory defines the scope of its moral community as “anyone whose interests are protected by the rules that contractors will agree upon” (216). However, there are disagreements among contractarians about who to protect. Since all of them are defined as being rational and self-interested, and each of them are equal to the others, who will be extended rights and protection? The answer is clearly people who are equally rational and self-interested, who have something to give and can potentially benefit from agreeing to the rules. In other words, contractarianism does not protect the vulnerable since they have nothing to sacrifice in return and the powerful gain nothing from them. This is why animals, nature, and infants are not part of the contractarian moral community even though they are most in need of protection.
Chapter 15 Summary and Analysis: “Ethical Pluralism and Absolute Moral Rules”
Chapter 15 marks a break from ethical monism, the belief that there is only a single moral rule that serves as the basis of all morality. All previous moral theories explored above are monist in nature. In other words, they all adopt one supreme moral rule as absolute (it cannot be broken) and fundamental (there are no other rules that justify this fundamental rule). Monistic theories are attractive because they provide a single, stable source of moral guidance. However, every classical theory considered thus far has been flawed.
Some turn to ethical pluralism as a potential solution. This is a family of views that posit the existence of multiple fundamental moral rules. Theories that fall under the umbrella of ethical pluralism can be separated into two camps: The first defends absolutism; the other rejects it. Shafer-Landau explores them in turn in the following two chapters.
The most prominent objection to absolutism is the “Argument from Disaster Prevention” (224). It claims there are times when breaking absolute moral rules may prevent a greater disaster from happening. This is the case, for example, when justifying the use of torture on a terrorist to obtain information about his peers and prevent further disaster. Many turn to consequentialism precisely for this reason: Consequentialism believes that the end justifies the means. However, there are cases in which the argument from disaster prevention falls apart. For example, if taking a small group of people’s organs to save a greater number of people can be seen as disaster prevention and minimizing harm, then consequentialists require this to be done.
Absolutists turn to the “Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE)” as their defense. It states that provided one does not intend it, certain types of acts that may cause harm can be permitted if one’s goal is worthwhile. Most importantly, the ends do not justify the means. If this doctrine is true, it refutes the argument from disaster prevention, utilitarianism, and act consequentialism. The difficult part of this theory is how to separate intention and foresight. For example, a doctor who must choose to save one patient or five others may choose to cure the group over the individual. Though it was not his intention to kill that one patient, it is also easy for the doctor to foresee the consequence of his choice. Without a clear way to differentiate between intention and foresight, the DDE may not be entirely valid.
Absolutists who believe in moral pluralism face a problem that monists do not: that of conflict between different absolute moral rules. This point is illustrated in “The Argument from Contradiction” (230), which states that multiple absolute moral rules will eventually conflict with each other. If this is so, then it generates a contradiction in which one must act in conflicting ways. Thus, it can be concluded that the theory of moral pluralism is false. The only defense against the argument from contradiction is to make sure the absolute moral rules never clash. This is only possible if they can be honored through inaction.
The “Argument from Irrationality” argues that absolutism is illogical (232). If there are instances in which obeying a rule undermines the purpose of that rule, then it cannot be rational to follow it. In other words, absolutism is fundamentally inconsistent. For example, if killing a crying baby can save a group of Jewish people from being found by Nazi soldiers, then it cannot be logical to remain passive. After all, doing nothing would mean everyone, including the baby, would lose their lives. Obeying the absolute ban on killing would generate more deaths.
A possible answer to this problem is the “Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA)” (233), which states that an individual’s duty is not to act immorally themselves rather than to prevent such acts from occurring. A superhero might choose to let a villain die rather than perform the act of killing them. It can thus be said that “absolute moral requirements apply only to what we do, and not to what we allow or fail to prevent” (233). For example, a person who chooses to spend their money at a restaurant instead of donating it to help starving children is allowed to do so because they did not directly perform the act of killing those children. However, the DDA might be morally questionable in circumstances where committing an act and letting it happen are equally condemnable. If an evil nurse killed a patient by withholding his medicine instead of administering a poison, that difference would not lessen her culpability. Despite its flaws, the DDA can be summed up as an attempt to address the argument from irrationality: It claims that committing harm is worse than letting harm happen, and therefore it is not irrational to obey absolute moral rules.
Chapter 16 Summary and Analysis: “Ethical Pluralism: Prima Facie Duties and Ethical Particularism”
Chapter 16 turns to ethical pluralists who reject monism and absolutism. W. D. Ross (1877–1971) was the first philosopher who defended this moral vision. He coined the term “prima facie duty” to describe moral rules that are not absolute. It is defined as “an excellent, non-absolute, permanent reason to do (or refrain from) something” (239). Ross argues that all prima facie duties are fundamental and cannot be derived from other principles. He lists seven such prima facie duties in his moral framework, all of which are of equal importance: fidelity, reparations, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence. Ross allows that this list might not be exhaustive. Shafer-Landau does not comment on each of these principles, preferring to analyze Ross’s model as a whole.
He begins with addressing the advantages of this moral framework. First, pluralism accommodates multiple fundamental moral rules, which may be more flexible than monistic theories. Second, since rules are sometimes allowed to be broken, it can account for extraordinary circumstances. Third, it avoids contradiction when moral duties conflict since none of them are absolute. Context dictates which wins out. Fourth, it allows for people to feel moral regret. If choosing to abide by one rule makes an individual feel regret at letting go of another, this reaction demonstrates the importance of the other prima facie duty and the individual’s moral righteousness. Finally, Ross’s model complements all three anti-absolutist arguments detailed in the previous chapter without relying on consequentialism. For example, in a scenario where an individual can benefit either A or B and has only made a promise to A but can benefit B slightly more despite B’s not expecting it, the consequentialist approach would push for the gratification of B since it yields the greatest good. Ross believes this to be mistaken since it would require breaking the promise to A. He concludes fidelity is a prima facie duty and consequentialism does not always yield results that are morally right.
The second half of this chapter turns to observe the difficulties of Ross’s moral framework. There is a fundamental problem to Ross’s theory: that of deciding which prima facie duties are real. Ross believes they are self-evident: His prima facie rules can be justified by adequately understanding them. They are true in the same way that the statement “all bachelors are unmarried men” is self-evident. Oftentimes, people must trust their common sense. To people who disagreed or distrusted his chosen seven prima facie duties even upon close reflection, Ross could only ask that they reconsider. These are philosophical impasses that occur when no additional evidence or alternatives can be introduced to support a staunch hypothesis.
Another problem arises when assessing in what instances moral rules can be broken. Ross does not believe in ranking his prima facie rules in order of importance, and there is no guideline for which rule to prioritize when they clash. However, this might not be a fatal flaw. This is because a system for determining which moral actions to take might not exist. Furthermore, Ross is not the only philosopher who defends this: Virtue ethics and feminist ethics also discard the possibility of an easy method for evaluating moral decisions. Finally, no fields of thinking (except mathematics) have easy formulas for deciding how to arrive at conclusions. Some situations might have a clear moral answer, while others do not. This is not necessarily a problem limited to the field of ethics.
The final section of this chapter turns to ethical particularism, the theory that rejects monism, absolutism, and prima facie duties. In other words, particularists believe that no moral rule is always morally important or decisive and everything depends on context. For example, they would argue that keeping a promise is not always important, such as when a promise is made at gunpoint. Thus, even when it does not conflict with other moral rules, there are instances where not keeping a promise is morally acceptable; therefore, fidelity is not a prima facie duty.
Particularism faces three main criticisms. The first is levied by monists, who accuse Ross’s theory and particularism in general as being too scattered. There are no fundamental moral rules that can serve as a pillar. This is a rather weak argument, as there is no way of knowing whether there truly exists one single fundamental moral framework. Another criticism directed at particularism claims it is useless as a blueprint for guiding our actions. Since any act can be good at times and bad at others depending on context, there are no roadmaps that can guide people. This argument, like the last, only stands if moral roadmaps exist. The strongest argument against particularism attacks one of its basic premises: that there is nothing of permanent moral importance. Shafer-Landau believes that prima facie duties can prove particularism is mistaken. This is shown through the concept of regret. For example, humiliating people for personal pleasure is almost always immoral. However, even in unusual circumstances where this act might be required, there is something to be regretted that it must be performed. Thus, particularism is mistaken in claiming that nothing is ever of moral importance.
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