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In Chapter 4, Kearns Goodwin discusses the Mexican-American War and the controversies surrounding it. Many Whigs and proto-Republicans opposed the war. Lincoln supported a Congressional resolution against the war and defended his antiwar stance, even at the risk that it would harm his political aspirations. Bates also opposed the war on the grounds that it was “part of a conspiracy to extend the reach of slavery” (123). Both Seward and Chase expressed reservations about the war but stopped short of publicly opposing it out of fear of the repercussions for their political careers. As Kearns Goodwin notes, “Manifest Destiny was in the air” (122), and the majority of Americans supported the war as a way to expand the nation’s territory.
As Bates’s position shows, the issue of slavery was inexorably tied up in the war. Seward, Chase, and Lincoln supported a ban on slavery in any new territories. Bates also supported the ban, known as the Wilmot Proviso, but on different grounds; he believed that if Southerners brought slaves into the new territories in large numbers, it would deter free whites from settling there, “thereby precluding growth and progress in the region” (124).
The war coincided with the 1848 presidential elections; as a result, the war and the expansion of slavery became central issues in the election. Some political parties rallied around slavery, while others fractured over the issue. The Whig Party triumphed with the election of Zachary Taylor, but schisms emerged within the party that ultimately led to its demise just a few years later. Demonstrating his propensity for practicality and compromise, Lincoln supported Taylor because he believed that Taylor was the most electable candidate. Seward opposed Taylor’s nomination but eventually rallied around him in the hope that he would widen the Whigs’ base. Chase split from the Whigs to help found the Free Soil Party, which was committed to ensuring that slavery was banned in all new territories. Bates was approached by the Free Soilers to be on their ticket as vice president, but despite his affinity for their central goal, he remained loyal to the Whigs.
During the convention to nominate Taylor, Lincoln and Seward shared a hotel room. Kearns Goodwin suggests that their conversation that night was a pivotal moment in shaping Lincoln’s future antislavery position. Kearns Goodwin notes that prior to that evening, Lincoln “had not delivered a single speech on the issue of slavery or initiated anything to promote the issue” (127). After the election, however, Lincoln drafted a bill for the emancipation of slaves in Washington, DC.
His proposal, in trying to find a compromise position, infuriated both slave owners and abolitionists. Lincoln left Congress—having failed to win re-election for his seat—without ever introducing the bill. Kearns Goodwin notes, “All these disappointments notwithstanding, Lincoln had forged relationships and impressed men who would contribute significantly to his future success” (129). She later states, “Lincoln’s ability to win the respect of others, to earn their trust and even devotion, would prove essential in his rise to power” (130).
Even as Lincoln’s career took a downturn, Seward’s and Chase’s gained momentum. They were both elected to the US Senate. Seward used his new position to argue even more vehemently against slavery and the black codes that limited black citizens’ rights in Northern states. Chase’s election was marred by accusations of political horse trading and self-serving shifts in party allegiance. Kearns Goodwin writes, “Chase failed to appreciate that with each party shift, he betrayed old associates and made lifelong enemies” (136).
In Chapter 5, Kearns Goodwin delves into the political and social landscape in the 1850s. It was a time of unprecedented citizen participation, in which politics was a “consuming issue” and nearly three-quarters of the population voted in presidential elections (140). The growth of newspapers and the expansion of railroads both unified the nation in their collective fascination with public issues and divided it on those very issues. Kearns Goodwin contends, “The chronicle of the 1850s is, at bottom, a narrative of the increasing strain placed upon these cords [that tied the Union], their gradual fraying, and their final rupture” (142).
Slavery was at the top of the list of divisive issues. The Missouri Compromise, which had served as “temporary solution” to the divided opinions on slavery, was strained to the breaking point by the expansion of territory as a result of the Mexican-American War. Although the North and South argued over other issues, those issues could be resolved through “political accommodation” in a way that slavery could not (142). As a result:
The spiritual cords of union—the great religious denominations—[...] fractured along sectional lines. The national political parties, the political cords of union, would be next, splintered in the struggle between those who wished to extend slavery and those who resisted its expansion. (142)
Henry Clay, who had authored the Missouri Compromise, took the lead in attempting a new compromise as the newly acquired territories formed into states. Clay’s proposal, which garnered the support of his fellows John C. Calhoun and Daniel Webster, heavily favored the slave-owning South. Seward, in his first address to the Senate, opposed the compromise, arguing for a “higher law” doctrine in which slavery was incompatible not only with the Constitution but with “the common heritage of mankind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the universe” (146). Chase, who had a national reputation for his antislavery stance, had the unfortunate luck to follow Seward’s well-received speech, and thus Seward was thrust ahead of Chase as the Senate’s leading voice against slavery. Bates supported the compromise and condemned Seward’s call to answer to a “higher law.”
Seward’s and the antislavery movement’s moment in the sun were short-lived. When Taylor passed away from pneumonia, the conservative Millard Fillmore ascended to the presidency, and Clay’s Compromise of 1850 was passed into law.
The political question of slavery heated up again when Kansas and Nebraska sought territorial status. Douglas proposed allowing the new territories to determine for themselves the status of slavery within their borders. Both Kansas and Nebraska, however, were north of the Missouri Compromise line; allowing them to self-determine on the issue of slavery meant voiding the Missouri Compromise.
With the introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, antislavery Northerners were “stirred into action,” while pro-slavery Southerners were “equally aroused” (161). Chase took the lead in opposing the legislation. He co-authored an open appeal, published in an abolitionist newspaper and reprinted as a pamphlet, that called on citizens to “protest by any means available” (162). The Kansas-Nebraska Act passed in the Senate, but it was met by mass protests in the North, as well as resolutions against it in seven states.
Lincoln, having returned to his law practice, “rode the legal circuit,” where he practiced his oratorical skills during mealtime speeches and debates with other lawyers. Moreover:
these travels provided the chance to walk the streets in dozens of small towns, eat at local taverns in remote corners of the state, and gain a first-hand knowledge of the desires, fears, and hopes of thousands of ordinary people in Illinois—the people who would become his loyal base of support in the years ahead (153).
Lincoln was on the circuit when the Kansas-Nebraska Act passed. The legislation “roused him as he had never been before. It permanently recast his views on slavery” (164). While he previously had believed that slavery would eventually die out on its own, he now knew that it would require government intervention. On October 4, 1854, at the Illinois state fair, Lincoln delivered his first major speech against slavery.
The fight against the Kansas-Nebraska Act revived Lincoln’s political aspirations. In 1955, he was elected to the Illinois State Assembly and was widely credited with ushering into power a “loose coalition” of antislavery Whigs and independent Democrats (170). He then declared his candidacy for the U.S. Senate and became the favorite among those opposed to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The antislavery coalition, however, failed to hold together when it came time to select a senator. Five antislavery Democrats, led by Norman Judd, refused to vote for Lincoln because he was a Whig. Rather than lose the seat to a pro-slavery Douglas Democrat, Lincoln withdrew from the contest and threw his support behind antislavery Democrat Lyman Trumbull, who then won the seat. Although Lincoln lost the Senate race, he gained allies who would play important roles in his future presidential bid.
Lincoln’s Senate race was a microcosm of political shifts on the national level as the major parties fractured and reformed, and new coalitions emerged, in response to the slavery issue. The Whigs eventually broke apart, while the Democrats became dominated by pro-slavery Southerners.
A new party, the Know Nothings, emerged in response to increased immigration in the 1840s and 1850s; they sought to prevent new immigrants from becoming citizens. Although the party also split on the issue of slavery and soon collapsed, “the nativist feelings that had fueled its birth would continue to influence the political climate” (181).
Antislavery advocates—“conscience Whigs, independent Democrats, and antislavery Know Nothings”—formed another new party, which in 1854 was named the Republican Party (181). Lincoln and Seward both initially were reluctant to join the new party, but Chase “was ready to commit himself wholeheartedly to the task of forging a new party under the Republican banner” (181); upon winning his race for governor of Ohio, he became the first Republican governor of a major state. Seward, who was elected to a second term in the Senate by an antislavery coalition in the New York legislature, joined the Republican Party after his re-election. In 1855, under the leadership of Seward ally Thurlow Weed, the remnants of the Whigs in New York officially joined with the Republicans.
The issue of slavery divided not just divide political parties, but also the nation, sometimes leading to violent conflicts, including one on the floor of U.S. Senate. After Senator Charles Sumner delivered an “incendiary” speech against slavery, in which he lobbed personal attacks against Stephen Douglas and Andrew Butler, Congressman Preston Brooks used his cane to “savagely bludgeon” Sumner (184). Sumner became a hero for the antislavery North, while Brooks “was equally lionized” by the pro-slavery South (185).
Amid the turmoil over the Brooks-Sumner affair, Lincoln held a state convention for the various antislavery factions in Illinois with the intent to organize them into the Republican Party. The convention was a great success: “Every faction seemed willing to concede something to create a party that all could stand behind” (185). Lincoln delivered a forceful speech that made him the leader of the Illinois Republican Party and stirred talk of a presidential run.
In 1956, the Republican Party held its first national convention in Philadelphia. Although Seward and Chase both sought the nomination, the party nominated the “celebrated explorer” John Charles Frémont as its first candidate for president. Frémont lost the election to Democrat James Buchanan.
Lincoln did not attend the convention, but he still came in second in the voting for the vice president nomination. Bates, meanwhile, remained loyal to the Whigs and presided over their 1956 convention, at which they nominated Millard Filmore for president under the banner of the American Party.
At the same time that the parties were picking their nominees for president, the Supreme Court was considering the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, in which Scott, a slave, was suing for his freedom on the grounds that his master had taken him to live in the free state of Illinois and the Wisconsin Territory. The court ultimately decided that black people “are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution” (189). Scott, therefore, did not have standing to sue in a federal court, and the case was dismissed. In reading out the decision, Chief Justice Roger Taney went further to argue that black people had no rights under the Constitution and that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional because slaves were private property protected by the Constitution.
Both Lincoln and Seward condemned the decision. In the Senate, Seward accused Buchanan of conspiring with the Supreme Court. The charge led Buchanan to ban Seward from the White House. Seward later delivered another fiery antislavery speech that many in the South interpreted as an intent to abolish slavery throughout the nation, despite Seward’s assertions that ending slavery in slave-owning states was “beyond the reach of national power” (192). While his speeches against slavery were seen as radical, Seward still saw himself as a moderate politician.
Lincoln decided to run for the U.S. Senate again, this time as the Illinois Republican Party candidate against Democrat Stephen Douglas. Lincoln was officially nominated by the Republican Party for the U.S. Senate seat in 1858. In his acceptance speech, Lincoln famously declared that “a house divided against itself cannot stand” (198). He argued that the nation could not continue as “half slave and half free,” stating that “it will become all one thing, or all the other” (198). Moreover, like Seward, Lincoln accused the Democrats of conspiring to subvert the Constitution by aligning the supposedly independent branches of government. Lincoln specifically named Stephen Douglas, Franklin Pierce, Roger Taney, and James Buchanan as co-conspirators.
As Kearns Goodwin notes, “So the stage was set for a titanic battle, arguable the most famous Senate fight in American history, a clash that would make Lincoln a national figure and propel him to the presidency” (200). Lincoln and Douglas took part in seven debates, attended by tens of thousands of people, following a format that today is known as a Lincoln-Douglas debate. The debates largely centered on the men’s differing interpretations of the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln focused on the Declaration’s proclamation that “all men are created equal,” whereas Douglas emphasized the right to self-government.
Lincoln, however, tempered his stance on equality to argue that although he believed that black people were entitled to “all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence,” they were “not my equal in many respects,” and he opposed allowing black people to vote, serve as jurors, hold office, or marry white people (204). Seward and Chase were more progressive on the race issue; both argued for removing the Black Laws in their states, and Seward supported black suffrage. Yet they also stopped short of declaring that black people were equal to white people.
Lincoln ultimately lost the race: “Though the Republicans had won the popular vote, the Democrats had retained control of the state legislature,” which would appoint Douglas to the U.S. Senate (209). Lincoln’s disappointment, however, was offset somewhat by his victory in the popular vote.
Slavery was at the forefront of national consciousness. The issue was two-pronged: 1) Are enslaved people endowed with any rights or are they the property of their owners 2) Who has the right to determine whether slavery is legal: the national government or the state government? These two questions created deep schisms across society, between religions, and within government institutions.
Amid this national debate, the Supreme Court heard one of its most famous and consequential cases: Dred Scott v. Sandford. The Court held that slaves were property and that the institution of slavery was protected under the Constitution’s guarantees of private property. Moreover, the Court asserted that the U.S. Congress had overstepped its authority in creating the Missouri Compromise, which determined which states could and could not have legal slavery. Although the Missouri Compromise had already been replaced by the Compromise of 1850, thus making the Court’s opinion on it moot, by including it in the Dred Scott decision, the Court sent a clear signal that it was it on the side of states’ rights in determining the issue of slavery.
Antislavery advocates, criticizing the Court’s decision, sometimes stopped short of advocating for full equality between black and white people. For example, Seward, whose fiery speech against the Dred Scott decision got him banned from the White House, believed that slavery was beyond the purview of the national government, yet he continued to assert that black people were inferior to white people. Seward’s biographer, Glyndon G. Van Deusen, noted, “Seward did not believe that the black man in America was the equal of the white, or that he was capable of assimilation as were the Irish and German immigrants” (205). Lincoln, too, also wrote that the founders did not “declare all men equal in all respects,” but that all men were “equal in certain inalienable rights” (190). Later, in his debates against Douglas, he stated that he had “no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and black races” (204).
Kearns Goodwin argues that such statements from Lincoln, Seward, and other prominent antislavery advocates did not so much reflect their own views of black people as they “reveal that racism, the belief in white supremacy, was deeply embedded in the country” (205). She further notes that scholars “have failed to find a single act of bigotry on [Lincoln’s] part” and that prominent black leader Frederick Douglass attested to Lincoln’s tendency to treat black people as equals (207). Kearns Goodwin argues for an instrumental interpretation of Lincoln’s statements against the equality of black men: He knew that he could not get elected if he argued for the total equality of black people. Moreover, he believed that if elected, he could use his position to educate people—to “penetrate the human soul” in order to eradicate “all this quibbling about [...] this race and that race and the other race being inferior” (207). Thus, Kearns Goodwin contends, “his comments [...] reveal a brooding quality, as if he was thinking aloud, balancing a realistic appraisal of the present with a cautious eye toward progress in the future” (207).
Although antislavery advocates stopped short of calling for the national government to abolish slavery—even as they advocated for abolition in individual states—many antislavery leaders began to assert that the nation could not continue to be united under what Seward described as “incompatible” political and economic systems (191). Seward predicted an “irrepressible conflict” through which the United States would become “either entirely a slaveholding nation, or entirely a free-labor nation” (191). Lincoln made a similar argument when he famously declared that “a house divided against itself cannot stand” (198). Lincoln, however, believed that the issue would be resolved through the inevitable extinction of slavery, so long as its expansion into the new territories was arrested: “Only [...] with the public mind secure in the belief that slavery was once more on the course to eventual extinction, would the people in all sections of the country live together peaceably” (199).
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By Doris Kearns Goodwin