American Lion: Andrew Jackson in the White House

Jackson faced a precarious situation as he sought compromises from both the manufacturing states and the Southern states; the former needed to accept a lower tariff, while the latter, including South Carolina, resisted accepting any tariff at all. He aimed to secure New York’s unequivocal support against nullification but faced hesitation from state legislators and even Vice President-elect Martin Van Buren, who feared political repercussions. On January 16, 1833, Jackson’s strategy evolved as he sought congressional approval for the Force Bill, which would authorize him to relocate federal revenue collection to secure locations; it would also allow him to use military force if necessary. The bill would grant the president explicit power to enforce federal law against American citizens within the United States.

Calhoun argued in the Senate that South Carolina had joined the Union with the understanding that a state had the right to judge whether to resist oppression or secede. He claimed that South Carolina was being threatened with violence for exercising this right. Though he was worried that his rhetoric might be too violent, Calhoun warned of the danger of a potential military dictatorship under Jackson, suggesting that “military despotism” was a greater threat than a divided Union.

Reactions to the Force Bill were mixed, with concerns about granting excessive military power to the president. Jackson’s strategy was to seek congressional endorsement, which would either provide him with clear authority or allow him to act based on existing laws from 1795 and 1807. As January 1833 ended, it appeared that the conflict would be between Washington and South Carolina alone. The other Southern states hated the tariff but valued the Union more, which was the best outcome Jackson could hope for. February 1, 1833, was South Carolina’s deadline to suspend federal tariff collections, potentially leading to violence. However, at Calhoun’s urging, the state decided to delay action to avoid benefiting the administration.

Henry Clay had been working on a compromise tariff aimed at resolving the nullification crisis. On February 12, 1833, he addressed the Senate, advocating for tariff reform to undermine nullification, thereby weakening support for the Force Bill and checking President Jackson’s power. Clay pointed out the importance of compromise and respect for South Carolina, suggesting that if the state abandoned nullification, it should be met with a reduced tariff rather than contempt. Jackson worked behind the scenes, reassuring Unionists that they would not be abandoned while insisting that they must not make the first aggressive move. He reiterated that federal action would only be taken if South Carolina committed an act of force or assembled an armed resistance, and even then, only after a presidential proclamation commanding dispersal. Calhoun declared that if the bill passed and Jackson used its powers, South Carolina would resist, even at the cost of death. Daniel Webster, a supporter of the Force Bill, rebutted him by asserting the unity of the American people under the Constitution, especially in matters of war, peace, commerce, and taxation. Webster argued that the Constitution’s primary purpose was to unify the nation. Ultimately, the Compromise of 1833 included gradual tariff reductions, a Force Bill allowing federal enforcement, and a proposal for distributing public land revenues.

In his second inaugural address, Jackson warned that the destruction of state governments would lead to revolution and despotism. He reaffirmed his commitment to using his constitutional powers to protect state rights while also maintaining the Union.

After Jackson’s second inauguration, the South Carolina convention met to address the compromise tariff and the Force Bill. Although the tariff was not reduced to the level South Carolina had demanded, it was still cut, leading many Carolinians, including James Henry Hammond, to accept the compromise. However, South Carolina symbolically nullified the Force Bill, signaling ongoing resistance to federal authority. In an attempt to reinforce state sovereignty, hard-liners proposed a test oath requiring officeholders to pledge primary allegiance to the state. Calhoun, advocating for moderation, cautioned against secession unless absolutely necessary, recognizing the crisis had been averted but the underlying issues remained unresolved. From Jackson’s perspective, the compromise was a victory. The tariff was reduced, his presidential powers were expanded, and the immediate crisis was defused.

In May 1833, Jackson was assaulted by Robert B. Randolph, a former navy officer. This was the first physical assault on an American president.

Meanwhile, Jackson was determined to destroy the Bank completely. He believed Nicholas Biddle was using federal deposits to undermine the government. Jackson sought to remove these deposits to fatally weaken the Bank. There seemed to be little support for removing the deposits, but Jackson remained resolute. Jackson’s challenge lay in whether he had the authority to act. Jackson’s strategy involved a new treasury secretary, William J. Duane, who was opposed to the Bank but had not been consulted on the deposits issue. On his first evening, a former Bank official visited Duane to outline Jackson’s plan to remove federal deposits from the Bank and transfer them to state banks—a topic Jackson himself had not addressed with Duane.

In June 1833, Jackson went on a tour of the Northern states. Jackson’s journey took him through Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Jersey, New York, and Boston, where he encountered large, enthusiastic crowds, which bolstered his confidence and sense of connection with the people. His opponents were unsettled by the fervent public adoration, likening it to the homage paid to a ruler rather than the respect for a democratically elected leader.

While on his tour, Jackson wrote to Duane regarding the removal of the deposits. Duane, adhering to a more traditional view of presidential power, replied that only Congress had the authority to decide the Bank’s fate. Amos Kendall, a long-time ally of Jackson, and Andrew Donelson were tasked with assessing whether state banks would accept federal deposits. Jackson expressed skepticism about the state banks’ willingness, fearing they were intimidated by the United States Bank’s power. Duane indicated he would resign rather than comply with an action he fundamentally disagreed with.

In early September 1833, Jackson’s Cabinet gathered, with Jackson presenting positive news from Kendall that state banks were willing to accept federal deposits. Jackson was still nervous, urging his secretaries to act against the Bank. During this time, Jackson denied involvement in Globe articles attacking Duane. Eventually, Jackson, impatient with Duane’s delay, decided to act. On September 19, news of the deposit removal was to be published, overriding Duane’s protest. Duane’s refusal to resign forced Jackson to fire him and replace him with Roger Taney.

In October 1833, Biddle decided to restrict credit and call in loans to create a backlash against Jackson’s removal of federal deposits from the Bank, hoping to pressure Congress into rechartering the Bank. By December, New York was facing a financial crisis, supporting Biddle’s strategy. Jackson anticipated the political battle in Congress and trusted that his reelection signified public support for his actions against the Bank, though he was fully aware that Taney would face Senate rejection. Jackson’s goal was to deny the Bank access to public funds, ensuring it could not secure a recharter by corrupting Congress. He believed that leaving the deposits in the Bank would enable it to buy influence and render his veto powerless.

Jackson’s foes, particularly Calhoun, were enraged by his tactic of appealing directly to the public through publications like the Globe. Calhoun believed the real struggle was over whether Congress or the President should control the Bank and, consequently, the country’s currency. He saw Jackson’s actions as part of a broader effort to concentrate power in the presidency.

Jackson’s strategy against Biddle and the Bank of the United States ultimately prevailed. The accusation that Biddle had misused the Bank’s power resonated with the public and their representatives. On April 4, 1834, the House of Representatives, more attuned to the electorate than the Senate, voted that the Bank should not be rechartered and that state banks should hold federal deposits. Clay then introduced a Senate resolution to censure Jackson for allegedly overstepping his authority by removing federal deposits and dismissing Treasury Secretary Duane.